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Going Mobile: Political Careers and 
Institutional Power in the European 
Commission
Zachary Arace
Case Western University
Abstract
The European Commission is arguably the most powerful component of today’s Eu-
ropean Union, yet little is understood about who actually comprises the Commission and 
how they get to Brussels. Scholars have thus far focused on piecemeal studies of back-
grounds of Commissioners, legislative approaches to Commission recruitment, or spatial 
models of multilevel governance systems (among others). In contrast, this paper takes a 
comprehensive approach to understanding paths to the Commission. To support this ap-
proach, a large-N data set of both institutional and personal (i.e., biographies and career 
histories) data of all Commissioners appointed since 2010 is constructed. This data set is then 
used to analyze three hypotheses relating political, socioeconomic, and personal variables 
at the Commissioner and national level—attempting to answer the question, “Which type 
of Commissioner is likely to be appointed from X country?” All in all, this paper hopes to 
illuminate underlying, broad-level trends in Commissioner appointments and spur further 
quantitative—and predictive—research on paths to the Commission. Who serves in the 
Commission impacts not only Brussels, but the entire European Union.
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Introduction
The European Commission is at the heart of European union. The Commission serves 
as the European Union’s executive branch of government, holding important powers, in-
cluding legislative initiation, enforcement of European Union laws and policies, and even 
the mystical role of “Guardian of the Treaties” of European union. 28 European Commis-
sioners sit atop this pillar of Brussels—but they are appointed by member states in a relatively 
opaque process shielded from any direct electoral competition. As Schmidt (2000) and oth-
ers have demonstrated, the so-called Eurocrats running the Commission (the Commission-
ers themselves) are more than just figureheads: they control the largest executive branch 
of government in Europe. Who are these Eurocrats? Are they a cadre of national elites, or 
does appointment to the Commission vary on a national level? How does this appointment 
process work?
As the European Union has expanded eastward since the fall of the Berlin Wall, states 
joining the Union in recent years hail from a decidedly different socioeconomic background. 
In terms of Commission appointments, variations in appointment processes or trends be-
tween more-influential, older member states and less-influential, newer member states (the 
majority of which are former Soviet republics) of the Union may exist. Moreover, the pace 
of recruitment to the Commission impacts countries with smaller, less-developed political 
recruitment supply pools more acutely than ones with larger, more-developed pools. In 
essence, does the Commission “capture” national politicians and keep them in Brussels for 
multiple terms, or is appointment to a Commission seat more fluid? And is there any differ-
ence between less- and more-influential member states?
Given these questions, this paper will explore the importance of the various factors af-
fecting Commission appointments, including personal1 backgrounds, career histories, coun-
try influence, and political climates within individual member states. The goal: to build 
an empirical base upon existing models in the literature that provides a broad overview of 
appointments to the current Commission, in order to explain any social, partisan, or career 
variations along any given dimension (if any variations exist). In essence, this paper will test 
the conventional theories of the European Commission’s place in the institutional hierarchy 
of supranational Europe. 
In exploring each of these questions and dimensions, this paper hypothesizes that ap-
pointment to the Commission does, in fact, vary by national influence; that political party 
has a strong relationship with appointment to the Commission, at least on the national level; 
and that the Commission is, indeed, a low-churn, high-incumbency office. Taken collec-
tively, this paper offers a more comprehensive assessment of appointment to the European 
Commission—a process that has important implications for both national governments and 
the Commission itself.
Surveying the Field: Common Themes, Disjoined Conclusions
Several lines of scholarship are pertinent to this paper’s discussion of European Com-
mission recruitment. One addresses legislative recruitment: the drivers behind, and the 
theoretical frameworks organizing, political careers in traditional parliamentary systems. 
Another emphasizes personal-career variables, such as prior offices held and general “ex-
pertise” of commissioners. Yet another considers perceived institutional power gaps in the 
supranational-national space as a possible explanation. While all contributions are invalu-
1	 	Including	socioeconomic	background,	education,	occupation,	and	prior	political	offices	held.
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able foundational pillars, none of the models—and little of the literature at large—robustly 
explains political recruitment in the European Commission.
Traditional Legislative Recruitment Approaches
Perhaps the most common lens through which to view political recruitment is the sig-
nificant body of literature on parliamentary careers. This classic mode emphasizes a hybrid 
of institutional and strategic models for explaining recruitment within political systems, and 
poses a number of theories. Above all else, this literature serves as a cornerstone for further 
analysis of political recruitment within supranational systems. The legislative model, in other 
words, informs basic arguments about the European Commission’s supply of appointment 
candidates and the mechanisms by which they are vetted and selected through the appoint-
ment process.
Legislative recruitment and, in a broader sense, passages to power, is often explained 
using four main factors: the actual supply of candidates; the demands of the selectorate, or 
those who vet and choose from the “pool of aspirants” (Norris 1997, p. 5); actual recruit-
ment processes; and the broader political system. On these first two points, the literature 
has historically focused on the role of political parties in marketing candidates based on 
ideology—“what members [of legislatures] stood for,” in other words (Norris 1997, p. 
6)—as the chief means by which the selectorate evaluated them. Similarly, another sub-
stream of recruitment literature saw the composition of political elites as a stable predictor 
of recruitment (Norris 1997, p. 6). Among others, Wessels (in one study) and Esaiasson and 
Holmberg (in another) “have demonstrated that the social background of legislators may 
matter not just for the symbolic legitimacy of elected bodies, but also for the attitudes and 
behavior of representatives” (Norris 1997, p. 6). Gender has also been shown to play a role 
in “attitudinal” differences in parliamentary parties, and can affect the “style” and substance 
of politics in parliaments (Norris 1997, pp. 6-7). These studies, however, are somewhat 
incompatible with the European Commission appointment process: national governments, 
not political parties, propose candidates for Commission appointment.
Fischer and Stolz (2011) provided a more structural approach to legislative recruit-
ment in their work on “level-jumping,” or the movement of politicians across gradients in 
multilevel governance structures. Fischer and Stolz’s study of Germany, a country that di-
vides power between a federal legislature and executive and 16 state governments (Lander), 
posits several models as to if, how, and why politicians transition between different levels of 
government. In the so-called springboard model, politicians move in a centripetal direction 
up to the national level (here considered the “apex” of political careers) (Fischer & Stolz, 
2011, p. 4). This stands in contrast to the alternative careers model, which sees politicians 
remaining fixed in mutually-exclusive territorial units—i.e., Land parliamentarians never 
leave the Lander and national politicians never leave the Bundestag (Fischer & Stolz, 2011, 
p. 4). Finally, the integrated model envisions moving, more or less, freely between territorial 
levels (Fischer & Stolz, 2011, p. 5). While innovative and useful for conceptualizing a multi-
level space for political career trajectories, Fischer and Stolz do not make any claims about 
the prevalent direction of movement or the characteristics of politicians who move within 
the system—and do not address the supranational European Union (Fischer & Stolz, 2011).
In general, there are several flaws to the legislative model as applied to the European 
Commission. For one, parliaments are inherently national-level institutions; they face struc-
tural, political, and institutional contours and constraints that are either absent from or dif-
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ferent at the supranational level. For another, in most democracies, citizens directly elect 
legislators—who then form a cabinet. European Commissioners, however, are appointed 
by the member states, vetted by the European Council, and approved by the European 
Parliament. While the argument can be made that voters have at least an indirect say2 in 
who is appointed to the Commission, the fact remains: there is no direct, electoral link 
between European voters and their Commissioners3. As explained in previous sections, the 
European Commission is appointed by all of the member states; thus, it can be assumed that 
Commissioners are not subject to the same electoral pressures that are present in “normal” 
elections—like those to the European Parliament, for example, or to most national offices 
in typical European Westminster or presidential systems. Voters, in other words, are not 
gatekeepers to the Commission. It is at this point that legislative recruitment models and the 
European Commission appointment process diverge.
Studies of Personal Histories
Another vein of political career research, especially that dealing with the European 
Commission, emphasizes the importance of common trends in the personal background and 
career history of politicians who “make it” to the Commission. Personal historians paint 
recruitment in sociological terms: the Commission attracts a certain type of politician—ones 
from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, ones who share similar career histories, or even 
ones who share roughly equivalent political preferences not only of the member state gov-
ernments, but also of the Commission itself.
MacMullen (2001), in a historical study of the composition of the Commission, argues 
that despite some major differences due to “national peculiarities,” Commissioners can be 
“fitted into broad gender, age, educational, occupational, and political categories” (p. 48). 
Further, “the majority” of Commissioners have been male, university-educated, politically 
centrist, have most often served in national government—“a national political career at the 
parliamentary and ministerial level is becoming almost the norm”—and usually possess “ac-
tive experience in European and international organizations” (MacMullen, 2001, p. 49). 
MacMullen (2001) concludes that, as the Commission has evolved on the European stage, 
“the political nature and significance of the Commission role has been recognized” and “the 
role of European Commissioner frequently appears as a logical progression” along modern 
career trajectories of European politicians (p. 50). 
While an important foundation, MacMullen’s work is somewhat limited, for several 
reasons. For one, MacMullen’s work is over a decade old (published in an edited volume on 
the European Commission in 2001) and thus omits four later Commissions from analysis. 
This obsolescence is glaring considering the European Union’s “Big Bang” enlargement in 
2004, which, among other developments, brought many former Eastern Bloc countries into 
the fold of the Union and increased the number of Commission seats by 20 % (from 20 to 
25). Additionally, MacMullen does not attempt to build a larger framework or model from 
his data—and does not take any institutional factors into account in his analysis of the data. 
In a similar vein, Georgakakis’s (2012) historical study of the College of Commission-
2	 	Voters	throughout	Europe	elect	the	European	Parliament	every	five	years.	They	also	elect	their	national	
governments	(to	some	extent,	varying	by	country).	Thus,	theoretically,	there	are	two	indirect	avenues	to	demo-
cratically contest European Commission appointments.
3  This	disconnection	is	the	basis	of	the	oft-maligned	“democratic	deficit”	in	the	Commission—a	topic	of	
substantial debate among not only contemporary European Union scholars, but EU policymakers themselves.
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ers up to Santer (spanning 1958-1999) attempts to provide a more robust statistical analysis 
to explain the significance of different personal background and career history variables. 
Among other variables, Georgakakis (2012) calculates and analyzes the statistical significance 
of occupations (significantly, both before and after Commission posts), length of mandates, 
nationality, and European experience (whether or not the Commissioner had served in the 
European Parliament, for example). Georgakakis (2012) concludes that the “classical con-
ception” of the Commission as either a realm for former ministers or skilled technocrats is 
not true, and that a seat on the Commission has evolved into a “social position” tied not 
only to the European Union in a broad sense, but also the other European institutions (p. 
72). Again, though, Georgakakis’s (2012) work suffers from the same flaws as MacMullen: 
his analysis does not capture the Commissions of the past decade4—leading to significant 
gaps in explanatory power—and his focus on the “organic sociology” of the Commission, 
while fascinating, does not provide a robust, workable explanation of Commission appoint-
ments.
With respect to these explanations of Commission composition and recruitment, this 
paper seeks not only to fill in empirical gaps left by old data, but also to build a more com-
prehensive model of Commission appointments—one that takes institutional variables into 
account and can be predictive, rather than solely explanatory. In other words, while the 
personal history mode of analysis can highlight shared traits of who make it to the Commis-
sion, it does not consider the empirical basis for these commonalities.
Institutional Power-based Explanations
Institutional power, in the context of this paper, has two meanings: attractiveness 
of the EU vice national office, and balance-of-power considerations between competing 
institutions at the supranational level. One implicitly emphasizes motivations of appointees 
themselves, while the other points to more micro-level strategic action (bargaining, almost) 
on the part of the appointers (initially, member state governments).
Through this lens, European Commission appointments are subject to a multi-player 
game at the European level (between member states at Council; between Council, Com-
mission, and Parliament for final approval). Member states must balance own self-interest 
and likelihood of approval of their candidate by other players5 in choosing whom to ap-
point. Appointment to the Commission, according to the institutional power view, thus 
requires a certain strategic pragmatism on the part of national governments: Will a given 
Commissioner hold the interests of Europe or the interest of his nation (and, by extension, 
his national government) closer to his heart? Stevens and Stevens (2001), along these lines, 
argue that, throughout the course of history, Commissioners have strayed from Schuman 
and Monet’s oath of “Europe above all”6 towards a more politically-motivated state of 
operation. The Commission as a whole (including staff), they note, has “sacrificed” the 
4	 	While	Georgakakis	does	discuss	current	President	of	the	Commission	Jose	Manuel	Barrosso,	his	analysis	
does not capture much beyond a micro-level examination of Barrosso’s personal, educational, and occupational 
history and European-level experience.
5  Again, as detailed in prior sections, the Commission President, other European Union member states, and 
the European Parliament may all oppose (both formally and informally) appointment candidates at various stages 
in the process.
6  As required by treaty, new Commissioners must swear an oath to serve Europe and the European Union 
above their respective national interests.
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“primacy of the merit principle” in staff recruitment, especially with the addition of new 
member states in the mid-1990s (Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 95).
Holger Doring (2007) takes a slightly different approach, arguing that the intellectual 
and occupational “caliber” of Commission appointees varies by member state, for a number 
of reasons. In a multivariate analysis of European Commissioners since 1958, Doring (2007) 
finds that party affiliation is a strong link, but (since 2004) more of a by-product of squeezed 
portfolios (p. 207). Additionally, Doring (2007) does find a “substantial” difference in ap-
pointment patterns between larger and smaller member states (p. 209). Like Wonka (2004), 
Doring frames his argument in terms of institutional power and principal-agent theory, but 
goes further in attempting to provide a “systemic account” of the variations in Commission 
appointments by member state, as well as capturing the “political importance” of different 
Commissioners at the national level, thereby communicating their relative stature and value 
(pp. 208-209). Doring (2007) goes as far as to emphasize the role of “domestic factors” act-
ing within a national dimension of a principal-agent relationship—but does not attempt to 
capture any empirical evidence of such a pattern (p. 225). Moreover, Doring (2007) does 
not build on his principal-agent characterization at the supranational level—losing a layer 
of explanatory power. Doring’s capture of “patterns of Commission appointment” (p. 225), 
including variation between small and large member states and also variation among large 
member states, is a valuable empirical foundation for this paper’s analysis (and, indeed, ad-
dresses some of this paper’s hypotheses almost word-for-word), but, again, lacks a compre-
hensive, all-inclusive framework for explaining Commission appointments.
Summary: A Dual Approach, Building on Doring 
This paper intends to build a more comprehensive model of European Commission 
appointment, encompassing elements of all three approaches to political recruitment: leg-
islative supply and demand, personal histories, and institutional power gaps. Most directly, 
this paper will build on Doring’s work on dichotomous patterns in European Commission 
appointment—testing not caliber of position, but country influence. This paper will also 
apply Doring’s framework to the Commission itself, examining the tendency of the Com-
mission to “capture” national politicians in an incumbent system. Both lines of investigation 
will enable a better understanding of European Commission appointment, composition, 
and effects on political recruitment pools at national and European levels.
Investigative Methodology
This project focused on a more comprehensive conception of European Commission 
appointments through more specific modes of inquiry and utilizing a mixture of scholarly 
techniques and models of Commission appointment (including those listed above) to ana-
lyze data on the personal, institutional, and national levels. The broad goal: a synthesis of the 
contemporary literature and new empirical data (collected herein) to analyze Commission 
appointments across various levels of investigation. 
Hypotheses and Associated Logic
Employing several different lines of analysis and theoretical approaches to Commission 
appointment, this project tests the following hypotheses (See Table 5 for a summary):
H
R
1: The less influential the country, the more likely their appointee to the Commission will 
have a technical or diplomatic background. “Technically-competent” means a politician whose 
Zachary Arace Case Western University
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background consists either of diplomatic service (under the auspices of national govern-
ment) or of European Union experience. The logic is straightforward: less-influential coun-
tries have more at stake at the European Union level—and more tangible benefits to gain 
from the Union—than more-influential countries. Additionally, less-influential member 
states are often not as experienced as more-influential member states at interfacing with 
the European Union—simply because most of the newer European Union members are 
also some of the least influential nations in Europe.7 Additionally, an empirical dataset itself 
captures accession date as a direct metric (See the discussion of the Political-Institutional 
dataset for additional information). Thus, because less-influential member states have both 
more at stake and less experience at the European Union level, they will strategically ap-
point Commissioners who are diplomatically savvy and technically skilled, rather than more 
self-interested8, diplomatically un-savvy politicians.
H
R
2: The more power a given political party has in a given national parliament and national 
cabinet, the more likely that party is to appoint cabinet ministers from the same party. Perhaps more 
simple truism than empirical position, this hypothesis is nevertheless important: will national 
governments reach beyond party and patronage to appoint the most competent candidates 
to the Commission (as they are required to do by treaty), or will they stick to more tra-
ditional appointment criteria and candidate filtering familiar to legislative recruitment and 
party politics?9 This paper, like Doring, posits that, at least in the context of national parties, 
traditional processes of political recruitment and advancement of individual politicians will 
hold: parties will seek to translate their electoral strength at home—and especially in the 
cabinet—to the European Commission.
H
R
3: Politicians appointed to the European Commission will remain in the Commission. While 
this paper only collected data on the current European Commission, this hypothesis remains 
important, and the prediction valid. The logic behind it is sound: given that the European 
Commission is usually perceived as the apex of the supranational political system in Europe 
(see discussion earlier in this paper), politicians—regardless of country of origin—are likely 
to remain at the Commission through each successive five-year appointment cycle. Here, 
the logic is dual-fold. Commissioners from less-influential countries may perceive greater 
power—and greater benefits10—from a seat on the Commission versus a seat in national 
government. Those from more-influential countries, on the other hand, may perceive a 
more beneficial environment—either in terms of tangible benefits noted in Footnote 10 or 
7	 	The	Influence	Index,	a	metric	used	in	two	empirical	datasets	developed	for	this	paper,	captures	European	
Union	accession	date	as	an	indirect	statistic	in	calculating	country	influence;	see	later	pages	for	a	more	complete	
description.
8	 	All	politicians	are	self-interested.	However,	in	this	present	context,	“self-interested”	is	taken	to	mean	a	
clearly-evidenced interest (empirically) in party and political career advancement, rather than national service or 
technical background. See later pages for an empirical discussion.
9  Loosely, such partisan theories of recruitment and political careers variously hold that institutional con-
straints, personal backgrounds (especially gender), and/or political party variables and processes effectively con-
trol	career	advancement	in	political	systems—and	not	pure	competence,	all	other	things	equal.	See	Beckwith	et	al	
(citation	provided	in	References)	for	a	cogent	summary	of	these	theories	and	a	critical	discussion.
10	 	Such	“benefits”	span	a	wide	spectrum	of	perks	inherent	in	almost	any	political	office,	and	include	patron-
age, prestige, and policy purview (portfolio). For instance, Commissioners control a vast European bureaucracy 
(patronage);	often	undertake	foreign	travel	and	meet	with	European	and	global	dignitaries	on	issues	of	importance	
to	their	office	(prestige);	and,	as	noted	earlier	in	this	paper,	have	significant	power	over	the	European	Union	as	
a	whole.	Such	a	combination	often	holds	allure	for	national	politicians—especially	those	from	less-influential,	
less-powerful countries.
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in terms of a less-competitive (read: non-competitive) electoral environment—at the Com-
mission level than conditions at the national level. Both, however, are based on an institu-
tional power model of the European Union (see earlier pages in this paper for a discussion).
Table 1: Hypotheses Summary and Relevant Details
Research Design
This project’s main empirical contribution is a collection and codification of two large-
N datasets containing data on various facets of the current College of Commissioners (in-
cluding Commissioners whose term ended earlier than their mandate—in this case, only 
one11). A metric used in both of these datasets (Country Influence) was also developed 
organically during the course of, and for the purposes of, this project. As noted above, col-
lection of these data facilitated the testing of three hypotheses and provided insight into 
additional trends not necessarily captured by one of the four formal hypotheses. This paper 
concentrates first and foremost on hypothesis testing, and then moves to highlight any ad-
ditional substantial and relevant trends.
The first dataset, called Political-Institutional, includes data on national and European 
Commission institutional variables, and is organized by individual Commissioner. There are 
29 main units of data (Commissioners) and 17 variables. This dataset aggregates institutional 
constraints and non-biographical trends in Commission appointments across the current 
College. Major variables include the following: 
• Date of EU Accession
• Country Influence Ranking (again, using the Influence Index)
• European and national party membership
• Absolute and relative results of most recently-relevant12 national Parliament and       
  cabinet elections
11  Scandal-ridden Maltese Commissioner John Dalli, appointed in 2010, was forced to resign in 2012.
12  For lack of a more cogent phrase to describe this variable: Because European Commission appointments 
are	staggered	across	various	national	election	cycles	for	individual	member	states,	this	dataset	identified	the	last	
election prior to the 2010 Commission appointment cycle in each member state, as national politicians elected 
during these individual cycles eventually decided Commission appointments.
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• Corollary coding of cabinet strength (e.g., whether the party had a majority in   
  the cabinet and whether or not the party held the head of government position)
• Corollary coding of whether the party in national government was the same as   
  the party of that country’s Commission appointee (regardless of affiliation—or   
  lack of—in a political party at the national level13)—this dataset’s most    
  empirically-relevant variable.
The Index of Influence is one of the hallmarks of this dataset, and of this project as 
a whole. Originally developed in Arace (2012) and updated for this project, the Index at-
tempts to provide a measure of relative country influence (on a four-point scale), using a 
plethora of relevant statistics, for each member state in the European Union. Statistics driv-
ing the influence ranking for each country include both hard measures (GDP, income per 
capita, land area, and population) and soft measures (EU accession date, Eurozone member-
ship, NATO membership, and European Parliament seats). The Index is a novel, effective 
way to measure member state influence—and thus provides a basis upon which to explore 
variations in Commission appointment based on member state influence.
The second dataset, Political-Personal, collected biographical and career history data 
for all Commissioners since 2010. Like Political-Institutional, Political-Personal is organized 
by Commissioner—the unit of analysis. Again, 17 variables were measured for 29 Commis-
sioners, totaling 493 individual data points. Key variables in this dataset include:
• Age
• Education
• Professional Occupation (prior to politics)
• Country Influence
• Prior offices held at the European Commission and in the European Union at   
  large (including Parliament), if any
• The last two offices held at the national level, regardless of chronology or overlap  
  with European office
• A derived summary of each politician’s “path” to the Commission, given prior   
  offices held. 
These data give a complimentary picture to those gathered in Political-Institutional, 
highlighting commonalities across the current College of personal traits and political career 
paths. This dataset thus provides both a mix of institutional constraints and sociological data, 
and provides a picture of the contemporary College of Commissioners.
13	 	This	refers	most	directly	to	those	Commissioners	who	are	independents	(i.e.,	not	registered	members	of	a	
political party) in their respective country.
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Table 2: Hypothesis-Dataset Map
Findings and Discussion
Major Findings
Hypothesis 1 (The less influential the country, the more likely their appointee to the Commission 
will have a technical or diplomatic background): Evidence is suggestive and supportive. Indeed, less-
influential member states appointed Commissioners who either possessed significant Euro-
pean Union experience or had a background in national diplomatic corps or technical civil 
service—or both. As summarized in Table 3, out of the 17 European Union member states 
that are less influential than the average European Union member state14, 9 member states 
(53 %) appointed Commissioners who had previously held political office in the European 
Union—including European Parliament seats and prior European Commission appoint-
ments. Additionally, of the six less-influential member states who did not appoint Commis-
sioners with direct European Union experience, half (50 %) of them appointed technocrats 
(defined here as politicians holding non-elected, technically-demanding positions in civil 
service) or former Foreign Service officers. Thus, 82 % of less-influential member state ap-
pointees to the Commission had some degree of prior experience with the European Union 
or diplomacy in general—either direct (European Union-level office) or indirect (European 
Union-related or foreign affairs-related office in national government).
14	 	That	is,	countries	who	scored	above	a	2	out	of	4	in	composite	Country	Influence.	
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Table 3: Results of Testing Hypothesis 1
On the other hand, more-influential member states also appointed Commissioners 
with European Union experience—but the relationship is weaker. Of the 12 member states 
that were more influential than the average European country, three-fourths (9 countries; 
75 % of more-influential countries) of them appointed Commissioners with direct Euro-
pean Union experience. The same number of such countries (9) had countries appointed 
a Commissioner with either direct or indirect European Union and/or diplomatic experi-
ence. However, in more-influential countries, the pattern of Commission appointees hav-
ing European Union-related experience in national governments is slightly weaker than that 
present in less-influential countries. Of those appointees without direct European Union 
experience, none previously held a European Union- or foreign affairs-related portfolio in 
cabinet. 
Thus, there is only slight variance between less-influential and more-influential coun-
try appointees in terms of European Union experience (both direct and indirect). This is a 
direct contradiction to Doring’s national influence theory. While Hypothesis 1 is thus tech-
nically supported, the results may thus point more to the validity of Hypothesis 3—what 
this paper terms the Commission capture hypothesis—than offer any empirically significant 
conclusions in and of themselves.
Hypothesis 2 (The more power a given political party has in a given national parliament and 
national cabinet, the more likely that party is to appoint cabinet ministers from the same party): Sup-
ported. In a vast majority of cases (83 % across all Commissioners), parties in power in na-
tional government nominated members of their own party for a Commission post. In the 
five cases where national party in power and Commissioner appointee party differed, two 
(40 %) were cases where the Commissioner was an independent at the national level.15 Of 
the other three cases, two (President Jose Manuel Barroso of Portugal and Androulla Vas-
siliou of Cyprus) were carryovers from the previous Commission; Barroso’s party was in 
power when he was originally nominated in 2004 (explaining the lag between appointment 
and the next relevant election in Portugal, which occurred in 2009), while Vassiliou’s was 
not when she was nominated in 2008. The remaining case (Stefan Fule of the Czech Re-
public) previously held the European Affairs portfolio in national government. Thus, party 
is strongly correlated to Commission appointment—but in the cases it does not explain, 
15	 	These	were	Andris	Piebalgs	of	Latvia	and	Dacian	Ciolos	of	Romania—both	less-influential	countries.
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European Union experience (both direct and indirect) is also a strong relationship. Again, 
as with Hypothesis 1, the strong relationship of European experience with appointment to 
the Commission, regardless of party affiliation, is a notable finding.
Hypothesis 3 (Politicians appointed to the European Commission will remain in the Commis-
sion): Supported with given data. More than half (52 %) of Commission appointments in 2010 
(the last appointment cycle) were carryovers from the last Commission. This means that ap-
pointees held seats in the 2004-2010 Commission (Barroso I)—but not necessarily that they 
had an identical portfolio, or held seats in Commissions prior to Barroso I. Commission-
ers seem either to become co-opted by the European Union and wish to stay, or national 
governments perceive re-nomination of an existing “Commissioner in good standing” as 
a political hurdle too high to jump vis-à-vis other member states. These findings present a 
novel relationship independent of political party or European experience: that of Commis-
sion capture.
Table 4: Support For/Against and Empirical Outcomes for Each Hypothesis
Additionally, several major trends in the data became apparent in both datasets through-
out the course of hypothesis testing. In terms of biographical credentials (e.g., age and level 
of education), there seems to be a trans-national elite across the Commission: all 29 Com-
missioners examined received a college education, and 41 % of Commissioners obtained a 
doctoral degree. Commissioners are also almost uniformly middle-aged (the average age of 
the current College is 58) and follow a linear career path, ending with an appointment to 
the Commission (86 % followed such a path; only 14 % held European office before hold-
ing national office). Such careers often begin in national parliament and plateau in national 
cabinets: 62 % of Commissioners’ last national office held was a senior cabinet position. 
Taken together, these trends point to a common elite following a well-trodden path to the 
Commission—and remaining in Brussels once there. Coupled with findings derived from 
hypothesis testing, they hold important implications for the composition of the Commis-
sion, as discussed below.
Zachary Arace Case Western University
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Table 5: Substantial Non-Hypothesis Trends in Data Collected
Eligibility Threshold versus “Intangibles”: A Common Elite?
Figure 1: Simplified European Commission Appointment Process
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Broadly, the patterns of European Commission appointments identified by these data 
fit several models identified by the literature—but also seem to offer conclusions not imme-
diately relevant to legislative recruitment, personal histories, or institutional power predic-
tions of Commission appointment. To this end, all three of this paper’s hypotheses are sup-
ported, although some more than others. Perhaps the most important finding of this paper’s 
empirical investigation, then, is the likelihood of European experience (again, be it direct or 
indirect) among appointees to the Commission—almost regardless of other variables. From 
these data, and from this trend of past experience at the European level, a clear path of ap-
pointment to the Commission emerges (one outlined above in Figure 1).
This paper thus posits that, instead of relative national influence, shared socioeconomic 
histories, or other variables, European experience (captured by previous European office(s) 
held, as well as any European-related portfolios held in national government) is key to ex-
plaining appointments to the Commission. Directly, empirical testing of Hypotheses 1 and 
3, as well as more informal trend identification throughout the data, support this assertion. 
There is certainly some degree of commonality across such biographical variables as educa-
tion and age—but most strongly among offices held. Partisan affinity at the national level is 
also strongly correlated—but is less important, at a broader level, than European experience 
among Commission appointees.
Context and Implications
This relationship between European experience and appointment to the Commission 
has important implications. Significantly, member state relative influence appears to be not a 
variable in and of itself, but instead a framework for analyzing European experience among 
Commissioners—and how that leads to appointment. As discussed earlier in this paper, 
more- and less-influential member states both derive benefits from experienced bargain-
ers at the European Union level, but for slightly different reasons. Appointees with direct 
European Union diplomatic or official experience, or even former national Foreign Service 
officers, often hold the same type of credentials, gained by a certain kind of experience with 
or at the European level, seemingly valued by both types of member states: experience deal-
ing with, and lobbying at, foreign governments. These skills are, however, arguably more 
valued by less-influential member states, as they have more to lose at the European level—
which explains the slight empirical variation. Both types of states value European policy 
bargaining experience, but less-influential member states value it more.
Common European experience gets to the heart of this paper: Is the European Com-
mission a common elite, or does appointment vary by member state? Certainly, as noted at 
several points in the previous section, Commissioners tend to share common “paper creden-
tials” (older age, higher education, cabinet service, partisan strength at home), but also share 
more of what Georgakakis would label “pro-European socialization,” in that they remain 
in Brussels for more than one Commission term. Commissioners, to some extent, tend to 
share a common European experience, and are thus a homogenous transnational elite in this 
sense. Relative national influence, again, serves more as a framework for explaining variance 
between the career histories of individual Commissioners—for example, why Germany 
sent a significantly less-experienced politician to Brussels compared to Slovenia—but is not 
powerful enough to delineate broader trends across the entire Commission.
For European Union member states, and especially for less-influential member states, 
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governments’ ability to replace departing officials with new, properly qualified16 ones is a 
real concern. Composition of government at the European Union impacts national supply 
pools of such politicians. European Commission appointment patterns identified herein thus 
seem to be troublesome for less-influential member states: Commissioners, once appointed, 
seem to be staying at the Commission indefinitely (Hypothesis 3). Because less-influential 
member states value benefits derived from the European Union (especially regional devel-
opment aid), they may gain from these appointments in terms of policy gains at the Europe-
an level—but may lose in terms of effectiveness and competency of government at home.17
At a broader level, Commission appointment is important not just for Europe, but for 
the United States and other non-European Union countries as well. For example, the Com-
mission is currently leading negotiations with the United States on a broad and substantial 
free trade agreement. Commissioners, implicitly, play a large role in these negotiations: 
policy bargaining is, at the highest level, dependent upon effectiveness and competency 
of Commissioners, who bring their personal histories and their policy experiences to the 
bargaining table in Brussels. Again, who governs at the European level is likely to affect 
policy outcomes and European Union effectiveness—even for foreign countries outside of 
the Union.
Further Research
Perhaps the most exciting outcome of this project is the diverse avenues of further 
research. The body of literature on the European Commission, as alluded to previously, 
is diffuse and developing—and this project’s empirical foundation provides a multitude of 
opportunities for further research. Outstanding questions raised herein range from Com-
mission appointment procedures and factors at the national level (the unit of analysis being 
national officials negotiating appointments) to post-appointment portfolio allocation to pol-
icy bargaining and analysis of (perceived) gains among more-influential and less-influential 
member states.
The avenue of future investigation most directly related to this paper’s research centers 
on incumbent Commissioners: Under what circumstances do incumbent Commissioners 
lose their seat in the College? As investigation of Hypothesis 3 suggested, Commissioners, 
like members of the United States House of Representatives, tend to stay in their seats once 
they are appointed. Hypothesis 3 can benefit from a more micro-level, case study approach 
to changes in Commissioners involving incumbents. Examining such events, and reasons 
for such events, with a fine-toothed comb at the national level will add empirical strength 
to Hypothesis 3.
Similarly, it may be important to examine perceived influence of the Commission 
(and, perhaps, the European Union as a whole) over time among both appointers and ap-
pointees. Have perceptions of apex of European system changed? More importantly, are 
this project’s results generalizable over time—over past Commissions? To examine these 
phenomena requires not only an extended data set, but also a first-person interview ap-
proach. Interviews of national government officials, who actually appoint, as well as retired 
European Commissioners, will inform future arguments about Commission appointment 
by providing a qualitative set of data not readily visible in quantitative approaches. Were 
16  Again,	those	able	to	break	the	socioeconomic	threshold	for	office,	as	well	as	those	sufficiently	experienced	
in national politics.
17  See the next section for a discussion of future research avenues on this topic.
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Commissioners, for instance, groomed for a seat on the Commission for their entire career, 
or was their selection more circumstantial? This project takes a more second-and third-level 
approach to these questions. Especially in the case of perceptions of power and strategic 
appointments (bargaining versus technical skills, for example), analysis of those actually do-
ing the appointing, as well as appointees themselves, on the national and European levels is 
key to understanding the fundamental causal mechanics of Commission appointment. This 
paper lays the empirical foundation for such an analysis.
Policy is another area ripe for analysis. First and foremost in this area is portfolio al-
location. How are portfolios allocated—beyond formal mechanisms? Is there a variance 
between less-influential and more-influential member states on this variable? Furthermore, 
is there a variance of policy outcomes and bargaining effectiveness between Commission 
appointees from less-influential member states and more-influential member states: do less-
influential member states succeed at the EC? Do they actually derive benefits? How does 
this impact appointment? This paper begins to hint at these questions, and proposes several 
analytical frameworks for analysis of these questions.
Conclusion
This project provides a strong starting point for further analysis of European Com-
mission appointments. Country influence, following Doring, remains an important variable 
and framework for explaining differences in appointments—but is not a strong corollary 
variable in and of itself. Empirically, having held a European Union-related office (either 
in the Commission, in the Parliament, or in national government European Union affairs) 
is a key explanatory variable in appointments of current European Commissioners. Because 
less-influential countries have more at stake at the European Union, they are more likely 
to send experienced European bargainers to the Commission to obtain favorable policies. 
Because Commissioners tend to remain in Brussels for multiple terms, however, national 
political recruitment is impacted, and arguably more acutely for less-influential member 
states. In today’s Europe, national politics are becoming ever more impacted by the Eu-
ropean Union. Commission appointment is just one chapter in this story—but one of the 
most important ones.
Author's Notes
The foundations of the research comprising the heart of this paper have, first and 
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Endeavors. Last but not least, the sound advice and hearty encouragement of Pete Moore 
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